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CASE STUDY 3: MOVEMENT LAWYERS AND 
COMMUNITY ORGANIZERS IN LITIGATION:
ISSUES OF FINANCES AND COLLABORATION
Paul R. Tremblay*
Baher Azmy**
At the Movement Lawyering Ethics Roundtable organized by the
Monroe H. Freedman Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics at Hofstra
University’s Maurice A. Deane School of Law, our assignment involved 
three ethics issues arising from the collaborative litigation relationship of
movement lawyers and their organizer clients. We offer here
three stories developing those issues and our assessments of the
tensions involved.
I. ISSUE #1: FUNDRAISING (INCLUDING LITIGATION FINANCING)
Your organization, the Community Justice Foundation (“CJF”), is a
multidisciplinary social justice nonprofit with considerable cash
reserves. CJF works with a nonprofit refugee organization, MigrantsCA,
Inc., that seeks to secure rights for refugees, especially those who were
unlawfully turned away by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) agents at the border. MigrantsCA engages in a wide range of
activities to organize and educate communities about conditions faced
by Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans.
CJF has worked with MigrantsCA on its organizing campaigns, 
advising it about various legal issues. CJF also works with MigrantsCA
on litigation. Many refugees have been unlawfully turned away by ICE 
at the U.S. Border with Mexico. CJF has filed a class action on behalf of
* Clinical Professor and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School. I thank
the participants at the Movement Lawyering Ethics Roundtable, hosted by the Monroe H. Freedman
Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics at Hofstra University’s Maurice A. Deane School of Law, and
especially Ellen Yaroshefsky, for the rich and productive discussion of these timely ethics
questions. I also thank Brandon Sloane for helpful research assistance and Dean Vincent Rougeau
and Boston College Law School for financial support.
** Professor of Law, Seaton Hall University School of Law. Legal Director, Center for
Constitutional Rights.
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44 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:43
MigrantsCA, along with individual plaintiffs whom MigrantsCA has
arranged to join the lawsuit. MigrantsCA has spent significant sums
from its limited budget to help the plaintiffs and has provided the
plaintiffs with housing, transportation, and food.
CJF lawyers and legal workers have traveled back and forth
between the United States and Mexico and cannot adequately represent
the plaintiffs unless they have access to them in Mexico. The plaintiffs
were initially housed in a shelter at the Mexican border, but now have
been forced to leave the shelter. MigrantsCA has tried to raise sufficient
funds to provide the plaintiffs with housing, food, transportation, and
spending money, but thus far it has had limited success.
The CJF lawyers have posed the following questions arising from
this scenario:
1. How might CJF assist the plaintiffs? The CJF lawyers believe that
concrete financial support should be possible. If so, how, and under
what circumstances?
2. MigrantsCA needs money to hire a development director for
fundraising. Might CJF help?
3. Are there any ethical considerations that arise when CJF applies to
grant funders to support its work with MigrantsCA? CJF knows that 
funders are more likely to provide money to lawyers for litigation
efforts, but litigation is only one part of MigrantsCA’s broader
strategy. MigrantsCA needs money as much for its community
organizing as for its litigation efforts. 
Ethical and Strategic Assessment of Issue #1
All three of the posed questions relating to Issue #1 might be
distilled into one overarching consideration: may a tax-exempt nonprofit
law firm provide its client with financial assistance to help the client
achieve its goals? That topic implicates some direct legal ethics worries
(ones that would apply whether the law firm was a conventional
privately-owned entity or a nonprofit), and some tax-exempt
organization worries (applicable only to public interest organizations
like CJF). Let us address the considerations separately.
A. Lawyers Providing Assistance to Clients
A lawyer may provide financial assistance to a client at any time, 
unless (a) the assistance is prohibited1 by Rule 1.8(e) of the American
1. The analysis here will address duties of and restrictions on lawyers arising from the
professional conduct rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed. For ease of discussion,
we will refer to the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which serve
        
         
     
   
   
          
 
        
      
           
     
 
         
        
      
          
     
     
         
    
    
  
     
    
     
                                                          
             
              
  
          
             
   
          
     
     
                 
              
           
                
               
             
            
             
      
          
452018] CASE STUDY 3: LITIGATION FINANCES AND COLLABORATION
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 2 or (b) the
financing triggers an impermissible conflict of interest.3 The question
posed here is whether CJF encounters either of those bans.
1. Model Rule 1.8(e) Considerations
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e), a version of which has
been adopted by most states, provides:
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the
repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; 
and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and
expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.4 
Rule 1.8(e) might strike many as an absurd restriction on a lawyer’s
generosity,5 but it has been adopted by most states with the language just
described.6 It is—perhaps to some surprise—enforced by the bar
regulatory authorities. Lawyers have been disciplined for giving or
lending money to indigent clients.7 Therefore, if CJF were a
conventional law firm, it could not provide assistance to its client
MigrantsCA, or to the individual plaintiffs, unless that assistance
qualified as permissible under the rule.
Let us then apply the rule to the MigrantsCA example. There is
little doubt that, as described, some of the proposed assistance would be
“in connection with pending or contemplated litigation.”8 CJF represents
generally as the basis for lawyer regulation in every state (including California, which began to
follow the Model Rules format on November 1, 2018). See Rules of Professional Conduct, ST. B.
CAL., (2018) http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rules-of-Professional-
Conduct. No jurisdiction has adopted the ABA Model Rules verbatim, however, so lawyers in
practice must attend to their home jurisdiction’s provisions to assess the propriety of any action they
intend to take.
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
3. Id. r. 1.7.
4. Id. r. 1.8(e).
5. See, e.g., Philip G. Schrag, The Unethical Ethics Rule: Nine Ways to Fix Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.8(e), 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 39, 44-45 (2015) (making that argument).
6. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) (8th ed. 2016).
7. See, e.g., In re Ralston, 794 S.E.2d 646, 647-48 (Ga. 2016) (holding to publicly reprimand
a lawyer for advancing funds to cover rent and prescription medication; bar counsel sought a
suspension); Att’y Grievance Comm’n. v. Kandel, 563 A.2d 387, 388-89, 391 (Md. 1989) (holding
to publicly reprimand a lawyer who provided funds for his client’s car repairs; dissenting justice
recommended suspension. Id. at 391 (Rodowsky, J. dissenting)); see also Schrag, supra note 5, at
58-62 (cataloguing cases regarding violations of this rule).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
     
   
  
       
   
     
      
    
 
     
        
        
      
     
   
      
      
          
      
      
        
        
     
 
         
       
  
 
                                                          
               
             
              
          
             
  
       
              
           
             
              
   
                 
                 
             
                 
               
           
46 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:43
MigrantsCA and other plaintiffs in a litigated class action, and the
plaintiffs need funds for “housing, food, transportation, and spending
money.” None of that, except possibly transportation (if for purposes of
the lawsuit, such as planning meetings, depositions, or court
appearances), would qualify as “expenses of litigation” which the rule
allows.9 Therefore, using conventional legal ethics analysis, CJF’s
lawyers could not share some of CJF’s funds with the plaintiffs to help
them pay their bills.
Before considering the funding for the development director, we
might address one possible work-around for CJF if it searched for a
strategy to support the indigent plaintiffs assisted by MigrantsCA.
Imagine the following scenario: In the class action filed by CJF on
behalf of the immigrants, MigrantsCA is not a named plaintiff. Instead,
selected individual members of the class who have suffered injuries
serve as the named plaintiffs, as is customary with class action
litigation.10 With this adjustment of the facts, MigrantsCA is a client of
CJF, but not for purposes of the litigation. The trigger of Rule 1.8(e),
that is, “financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation,” will be absent.11 That strategy eliminates Rule
1.8(e) as a ban on the proposed donation. If CJF provides funds to the
MigrantsCA organization for its own use, MigrantsCA may use the
funds as it sees fit, including to provide food, housing, and other aid to
the plaintiffs.
Rule 1.8(e) does not apply to transactional lawyers. It only applies
to litigators.12 If CJF were to separate out its litigation activity from its
other, more transactional lawyering activity on behalf of MigrantsCA, its
donations to MigrantsCA would pass muster under Rule 1.8(e).13 
9. See Kandel, 563 A.2d at 389-90 (rejecting the lawyer’s argument that the client’s car
repairs related to the personal injury action for which the lawyer provided legal services).
10. In class action proceedings, the named plaintiff serves as a proxy or representative for the
collective harmed group. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1318, 1592-1604 (1976) (describing the class lawyer’s duty to the class more than to any named
plaintiff).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(e).
12. See Alex Petrossian, Note, Finally Some Improvement, But Will It Accomplish Anything?
An Analysis of Whether the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill Can Survive the Ethical Challenges Headed
Its Way, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2013, 2051 (2013) (“[I]t seems clear that attorneys do not violate
1.8(e) by working with a charitable organization that posts bail for its clients.”); Schrag, supra note
5, at 44.
13. It is true that Model Rule 8.4(a) declares it misconduct for a lawyer to “violate or attempt
to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . through the acts of another . . . .” MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). CJF must assess whether the strategy described
in the text qualifies as the firm’s circumvention of Rule 1.8(e) by use of a proxy. The opinion here is
that Rule 8.4(a) does not fit in this scenario. The suggested strategy leaves CJF with some unaided
clients whom it represents in litigation and another client, MigrantsCA, which it presents in other
        
  
          
    
    
       
  
       
   
        
     
  
       
  
         
       
      
    
     
       
       
      
  
     
      




                                                          
           
              
            
           
             
            
           
 
       
              
               
              
       
                
                
             
   
472018] CASE STUDY 3: LITIGATION FINANCES AND COLLABORATION
There is one important risk inherent in the strategy just described. If
CJF does not represent MigrantsCA on any matter other than to litigate
this class action, and if the lawyers and MigrantsCA include the
individual immigrant refugees as named plaintiffs, CJF encounters a
Rule 8.4(a) challenge. That rule prohibits a lawyer from violating a
professional conduct rule, directly or “through the acts of another.”14 If it
is true that CJF cannot expressly fund the housing needs of its named
plaintiffs, which we agree would be forbidden, it cannot accomplish the
same result by giving the money to another client (or even a non-client)
who will supply the funds to the plaintiffs.15 Therefore, the earlier-
described strategy, where CJF assists MigrantsCA with nonlitigation,
but fungible, financial assistance appears to succeed if and only if CJF
has a separate representational relationship with MigrantsCA.
Next, we must consider whether the other support CJF considers,
that is, funding for a new development director, would also trigger Rule
1.8(e), even if MigrantsCA remains a plaintiff. Our assessment is that it
does not. Rule 1.8(e) prohibits assistance “in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation.”16 While MigrantsCA may be a litigation client
of CJF, its need for a development director is a more global need that
would exist separate from the ongoing litigation. It would call for a
crabbed, distorted reading of Rule 1.8(e) to conclude that a lawyer
representing a multiservice grassroots organization in some litigation
cannot donate funds for that organization’s ongoing needs. No reported
disciplinary decision has sanctioned a lawyer for donating to a nonprofit
client while also representing the client,17 and our conclusion is that no
such discipline would be warranted.
matters. What MigrantsCA does with the donations it receives from CJF is entirely up to
MigrantsCA. In that same vein, the proposed arrangement does not appear to implicate Rule 1.8(a),
governing business transactions between a lawyer and her client. Cf. Petrossian, supra note 12, at
2051-52 (describing a lawyer-supported bail bond arrangement as likely triggering Rule 1.8(a)).
CJF is not arranging for a financial assistance program for its clients; it is allowing MigrantsCA to
increase its resources, some of which will filter down to CJF’s clients. If CJF does not otherwise 
represent MigrantsCA on other matters, this concern has more weight, which the proceeding text
explains.
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a).
15. See NYSBA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1145 (2018) (providing financing through a
litigation funder violates Rule 1.8(e) through the use of the intermediary); Schrag, supra note 5, at
63-64 (noting that a lawyer may not circumvent Rule 1.8(e) by using an intermediary).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(e).
17. Our research shows that every reported discipline based upon a violation of Rule 1.8(e)
involved an individual client. See, e.g., Schrag, supra note 5, at 44-45 (canvassing the cases). Our
separate research efforts have uncovered no examples of discipline based on Rule 1.8(e) where the
client was an organization.
     
   
   
 
   
    
    
      
   
       
   
 
    
         
     
 
        
       
      
  
      
      
 
     
      
      
        
     
       
      
      
       
                                                          
         
    
            
             
             
            
          
             
               
              
             
          
           
48 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:43
Finally, let us address one further permutation of the litigation 
financing puzzle involving Rule 1.8(e). Imagine the following variation
of the MigrantsCA and CJF story:
CJF has solicited the pro bono services of Durkin Gibson LLP, a
multinational law firm with a commitment to public service, to serve as
co-counsel with CJF on the litigation involving MigrantsCA. Durkin
Gibson has been a loyal supporter of CJF, including providing regular
end-of-year donations to CJF in response to the nonprofit’s annual
fundraising campaign. May CJF donate some or all of the Durkin
Gibson funds to MigrantsCA to assist with the latter’s community
organizing efforts?
Whether that use of the Durkin Gibson money is proper depends, in 
our opinion, on the intent of Durkin Gibson. If the law firm’s charitable
strategy were to support MigrantsCA with non-litigation financial help
while it represented the client in litigation, it would be forbidden to do so
by Rule 1.8(e), as we have seen above.18 Durkin Gibson may not avoid 
the Rule 1.8(e) prohibition by using CJF as a conduit. In other words,
the law firm could not hatch a plan where, instead of providing the
forbidden direct financial support to MigrantsCA, it sought to funnel that
support through CJF as a conduit. Doing so plainly appears to be in
violation of Rule 8.4(a), which as we saw above prohibits a rule
violation through the actions of another.19 
But if, instead, Durkin Gibson’s donation was meant to support the
full portfolio of work performed by CJF, then the donation to
MigrantsCA would be entirely proper, it seems to us, so long as CJF
could lawfully donate any of its money to MigrantsCA. CJF’s funding is
of course fungible, and while the dollars donated by CJF to MigrantsCA
might be the same dollars donated to CJF by Durkin Gibson, it is
difficult to imagine that a disciplinary authority would conclude that
those dollars represent the law firm’s improper Rule 1.8(e) support to its
client.20 Intent matters in attorney discipline circles,21 so the absence of a
18. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
19. See id.
20. Several bar association ethics opinions have addressed the fungibility of money in
concluding that certain uses of attorney’s fee dollars do not violate the rule against fee-splitting with
nonlawyers. See, e.g., Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal
Op. 2007-172 (2007) (noting that lawyers may properly accept payments of fees by credit card,
including the service fees, notwithstanding a literal violation of California fee-splitting rule);
Oregon Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 2005-133 (2005, revised 2014) (noting that a credit
arrangement to pay lawyers’ fees in return for ten percent financing charge does not violate the fee-
splitting rule); see also Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof. Guid. Comm., Informal Op. 2003-15 (2003)
(illustrating that a law firm may take out non-recourse loan from funding company to cover
litigation costs); Ill. Bd. of Governors Comm., Op. 92-9 (1993) (same).
21. See Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J.
        
      
 
      
     
     
    
    
    
     
      
         
         
      
       
   
     
     
 
     
   
      
 
      
 
  
         
      
       
       
         
 
                                                          
              
             
            
              
                 
           
             
       
             
  
492018] CASE STUDY 3: LITIGATION FINANCES AND COLLABORATION
plan to use CJF as a conduit to send funds to MigrantsCA would very
likely preclude any disciplinary worries.
There is yet one other potential strategy that would, we conclude,
justify Durkin Gibson’s direct payment to MigrantsCA even while the
law firm represented the client in litigation. If MigrantsCA were a tax-
exempt Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit eligible to receive tax-deductible
donations from the general public,22 Durkin Gibson should be able to
make such a tax deductible donation to the nonprofit even if the funds
were likely to be used other than for litigation expenses. Here’s why:
Imagine that an attorney regularly sent a donation each year on
December 31st to her favorite charity, year after year. If that attorney in
one of those years happens to offer her pro bono legal services to assist
the charity to resolve a litigation dispute, it would defy all logic to
suggest that she would therefore be forbidden from sending her annual
donation to the charity, until the litigation relationship ended. Her best
(and correct) argument would be that the charitable donation is not
“in connection” with the litigation, and therefore Rule 1.8(e) has
no applicability.23 
If that thought experiment works, then the same analysis would
apply to Durkin Gibson’s donation to the charity MigrantsCA. There is
nothing magic about the thought experiment’s including a history of
payments. That fact appeared only as a rhetorical device. A donation to a
tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organization should not fall within the ambit of
Rule 1.8(e).
2. Non-Rule 1.8(e) Considerations
Even if Rule 1.8(e) does not apply, the inquiry does not end. It is 
possible that CJF’s financing the work of MigrantsCA, either by
assisting its constituents with funding for their necessities of living or
supporting the hire of a new development director, might implicate some
conflict of interest worries. Our conclusion is that, as applied to the
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 12-15 (2010) (arguing that the disciplinary rules should not be seen as strict
liability provisions); Matthew A. Smith, Note, Advice and Complicity, 60 DUKE L.J. 499, 529-30
(2010) (noting that a lawyer’s intent matters when advising clients about crimes or frauds).
22. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015) (granting tax-exempt status to certain types of community
or charitable organizations). The argument we propose in the text might be just as viable for any
community-based organization that relies on support from donors and friends, even if the support
does not qualify for a tax deduction. But its persuasive power is more apparent when we imagine 
MigrantsCA as a Section 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization.
23. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(e); see also supra notes 4-22 and
accompanying text.
     
      
  
          
        
       
        
     
         
     
       
        
        
         
      
      
 
         
       
        
     
     
   
   
    
     
      
  
                                                          
          
      
                
          
              
 
            
             
             
                
             
         
          
            
           
        
            
              
50 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:43
example described above, few if any conflict concerns arise, but the
facts of any concrete narrative might lead to a different result.
Rule 1.7(a)(2) states that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if . . . 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest
of the lawyer.”24 An accompanying provision, Rule 1.2(a), declares that
“a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”25 The upshot of these
two rules is that CJF must respect its client’s goals and preferences and
not distort the representation by its own needs or commitments.26 If
CJF’s funding of MigrantsCA were, as a direct result of that action, to
influence the advice or strategies CJF offers to its client, that would
represent a conflict of interest that would require MigrantsCA’s
informed consent.27 
If CJF’s financial support to MigrantsCA would alter or distort the
nature of the representation it offered to its client, that effect would need
to be addressed, and it might prohibit either the financial support or the
representation. Nothing in the example offered here even hints of such
distortion or influence. Therefore, if not prohibited by Rule 1.8(e), the
assistance would be acceptable and would not subject the lawyers
involved to discipline.28 We do note, though, that a grassroots advocacy
organization like MigrantsCA has every right, should its membership
discern it to be useful for the organization’s mission, to accept direction 
from a prominent and thoughtful legal services organization or its
lawyers.29 This topic arises in Issue #3 below.30 
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
25. Id. r. 1.2(a).
26. See id. r. 1.8(f) (permitting third parties to pay for a client’s lawyer’s time, so long as that
third party funder does not interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment).
27. See id. r. 1.7(b) (permitting consent to certain conflicts under certain identified
conditions).
28. If CJF were to fund MigrantsCA impermissibly, the individual lawyers representing
MigrantsCA would likely face discipline. Except in rare circumstances, law firms are not subject to
discipline. See Alex B. Long, Employment Discrimination in the Legal Profession: A Question of
Ethics?, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 445, 467 (2016) (“[A]s a rule, law firms are not subject to
discipline.”); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4
(1991). Instead, the lawyers involved would be subject to discipline.
29. The role tensions of lawyers representing community groups, including the proper
participatory role of the lawyers in group decision-making, have been explored elsewhere. See, e.g., 
Michael Diamond & Aaron O’Toole, Leaders, Followers, and Free Riders: The Community
Lawyer’s Dilemma when Representing Non-Democratic Client Organizations, 31 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 481, 486-87 (2004); Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community
Campaigns, Law, and Social Change, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2133, 2141 (2007). See generally Stephen
        
  
       
    
      
   
         
    
     
      
  
      
      
        
      
     
     
    
  
         
     
   
 
    
      
   
       
 
                                                          
        
              
         
       
        
              
            
              
        
           
     
               
               
            
         
        
           
512018] CASE STUDY 3: LITIGATION FINANCES AND COLLABORATION
B. Nonprofit Organizations Providing Assistance to Clients
There is a separate perspective that warrants exploration on the
question about CJF supporting MigrantsCA. CJF is not a conventional
law firm. It is an IRC Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization whose
mission includes advocacy, community organizing, education, and
provision of legal services. Rule 1.8(e) applies to lawyers and therefore
to a law firm populated by lawyers.31 The consideration to be examined
here is whether CJF, given its multiple missions, may support
MigrantsCA financially, even in the midst of active litigation on its
behalf, using funds other than those intended for the legal representation.
The answer to that question must be yes. Let us examine the
proposition carefully. We first recognize the uncontroversial fact that an
organization not operated for profit may provide an array of services to
its constituents, including legal services.32 If such an organization, for
example, provided rent support or housing assistance to the same family
it represented in litigation,33 no bar counsel’s office would seek to
discipline the nonprofit’s lawyers using Rule 1.8(e) because their larger
organization provided help with the client’s shelter. Indeed, it would
strain credulity to claim that the lawyer was providing the assistance just
because the multiservice agency delivered the support to the lawyer’s
client. To no surprise, no reported discipline case exists showing such an
attack on the nonprofit’s lawyers.34 
Therefore, if CJF as an organization separated out its allocation of
its charitable resources and provided explicit funding to MigrantsCA as
a supportive, general-revenue donation, during a time when CJF lawyers
represented in the class action lawsuit both MigrantsCA and the
Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in
Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (2002); Paul R. Tremblay,
Counseling Community Groups, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 389 (2010). 
30. See infra Part III.
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8.
32. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (recognizing the First
Amendment right of nonprofit corporations to provide legal services); Kermit J. Lind, Can Public
Nuisance Law Protect Your Neighborhood from Big Banks?, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 89, 103 (2011)
(describing Neighborhood Progress, Inc. as a Cleveland-based “multidisciplinary program that
provides detailed property information, financial assistance, and legal services to a set of high-
performing, neighborhood-based nonprofit development corporations”).
33. See, e.g., Keri D. Brown, Richard and Elizabeth Husseini: Making a Difference in More 
Ways than One, 49 HOUS. LAW. 12, 12 (2012) (“Many . . . know Catholic Charities for its work
providing legal services to immigrants; however, the work of Catholic Charities is much broader
and encompasses many program areas, such as adoption assistance, assistance to senior citizens,
housing assistance, disaster assistance and an AIDS ministry.”).
34. Our research efforts have uncovered no such example of discipline.
     
        
 
         
  
         
        
   
            
     
 
     
        
         
     
 
 
    
    
          
    
     
     
       
   
     
      
     
       
  
     
     
 
                                                          
          
             
            
           
            
   
          
52 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:43
individuals who received the financial help, any worries about Rule
1.8(e) should be eliminated.
II. ISSUE # 2: FINANCING OUT (FEES AND MOVEMENT GROUPS)
This example connects to the original story. The litigation filed by
CJF ensues for several years, and ultimately CJF prevails and obtains an
award of attorneys’ fees. MigrantsCA has spent hundreds of hours on
organizing, educating, and supporting the litigation, and its work has
made a significant difference in the progress of the case. It is a fact
that the litigation could not have been undertaken without the work
of MigrantsCA.
MigrantsCA has many significant projects beyond supporting this
litigation, and its funds are very tight. Its fundraising efforts have been
robust, but it is difficult to raise sufficient support for its work. CJF
would like to donate a significant portion of the fee award to
MigrantsCA. May it do so?
Ethical and Strategic Assessment of Issue #2
The legal ethics question presented by this second example is
whether lawyers or law firms may share fees with nonlawyers. The basic
rule is no: “A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a
nonlawyer,” according to Rule 5.4.35 The concern here is about the 
independence of lawyers. The ban is “directed mainly against
entrepreneurial relationships with nonlawyers and primarily [is] for the
purpose of protecting a lawyer’s independence in exercising professional
judgment on the client’s behalf free from control by nonlawyers.”36 
But Rule 5.4 includes several exceptions, and one of those applies
directly to the CJF/MigrantsCA relationship. Rule 5.4(a)(4) states that “a
lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization
that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in
the matter.”37 The ABA added that exception to implement the sentiment
of ABA Formal Opinion 93-374, which reached the same conclusion by
reasoning that when a nonprofit organization is involved, there is less of
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
36. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-423 (2001).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a)(4). Some jurisdictions, including the District
of Columbia, Massachusetts, and South Dakota, further limit the “nonprofit organization” recipients
to those with federal tax-exempt status. See AM. BAR ASS’N, Variations of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/
rule_charts.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (illustrating jurisdictional rules comparison charts).
        
    
 
       
    
       
 
     
       
       
      
       
      
   
 
       
    
    
       
     
      
        
    
       
      
    
    
  
       
     
    
                                                          
             
          
  
            
          
           
               
             
               
        
                 
             
   
       
532018] CASE STUDY 3: LITIGATION FINANCES AND COLLABORATION
a threat to the lawyer’s independent judgment than when a for-profit
arrangement is in place.38 
The challenge for many movement lawyers, however, is that more 
than a dozen states have adopted a version of Rule 5.4(a) that fails to
include the safety net provided by Rule 5.4(a)(4).39 Without that explicit
exception, a law firm like CJF risks noncompliance with the otherwise-
well-established principle that a lawyer may not share fees with a
nonlawyer.40 Not only is it a disciplinary violation to engage in such fee
sharing, but in some jurisdictions doing so constitutes a criminal offense
for both the lawyer and the nonlawyer.41 There appear to be credible
First Amendment challenges to enforcement of that ban when the
sharing of legal fees is with a public interest organization.42 Those
sophisticated constitutional arguments are beyond the scope of
this Article. 
For lawyers operating in a jurisdiction that does provide the Model
Rule 5.4(a)(4) safe harbor, one additional scenario warrants our
consideration. We concluded just above that Rule 5.4(a)(4) expressly
permits a law firm’s sharing of court-awarded legal fees with “a
nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended
employment of the lawyer in the matter.”43 That language might imply 
that the law firm may not donate some amount of its general funds to a
community organization or non-governmental organization (“NGO”),
funds that were generated via legal fees paid by clients, if those funds
were not “court-awarded” and the NGO did not employ, retain, or
recommend the firm. Would a donation by a law firm such as Durkin
Gibson to an activist organization like MigrantsCA amount to unlawful
fee sharing, even in the more liberal jurisdictions?
The answer to that question must be no, but confident support for
that answer is surprisingly elusive. Law firms make donations to
charities all the time, of course. While a charitable donation to a legal
38. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-374 (1993);
see also ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, § 5.4(a) (2018) (discussing that opinion
and its reasoning).
39. See Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 37 (listing
Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming as states without Rule 5.4(a)(4) or an equivalent provision).
40. See, e.g., NYBSA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 906 (2012) (confirming that in New York 
a division of fees allowed by Rule 5.4(a)(4) would subject a lawyer to discipline).
41. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 491 (McKinney 2018) (misdemeanor “to divide” lawyers’ fees
with a nonlawyer or to “receive” such fees).
42. See Op. 906, supra note 40 (noting that possibility); Roy D. Simon, Jr., Fee Sharing
Between Lawyers and Public Interest Groups, 98 YALE L.J. 1069, 1126-32 (1989) (developing the
First Amendment arguments).
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a)(4).
     
      
       
     
  
   
       
       
  
 
          
      
        
         
         
    
       
     
  
      
     
     
      
       
 
        
   
    
     
                                                          
              
            
      
              
    
          
              
            
              
         
             
               
           
       
54 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:43
services organization (as much of law firm philanthropy will be)
arguably would satisfy Rule 5.4 because the legal fees, if they are
considered “shared” at all, are shared with lawyers, not with
nonlawyers,44 lawyers and law firms also provide charitable
contributions to non-legal nonprofits.45 Some ethics opinions have 
confirmed that such bequests will not contravene Rule 5.4, while
acknowledging that the rule might literally appear to prohibit such
philanthropy. An Arizona ethics opinion captured the appropriate
sentiment in elegant fashion:
If [Arizona’s Rule] 5.4(a) were interpreted literally and taken to its
most ludicrous extreme, it would mean that lawyers cannot donate any
of their income to charities because it would be “sharing” a fee with a 
nonlawyer. Thus, lawyers who derive their income from fees never can
donate money. This interpretation of [Rule] 5.4 not only is beyond the 
intended purposes of the Rule, but is against public policy.46 
The Philadelphia Bar Association’s ethics committee arrived at a
similar conclusion.47 Some older ethics opinions, however, have 
disagreed and deemed charitable contributions as effecting
impermissible fee sharing.48 Given how prevalent and public law firm
philanthropy is today,49 we may confidently conclude that the older
opinions are outdated and are no longer a concern for attorneys in 2018.
A firm such as Durkin Gibson may safely support an organization like
MigrantsCA without a worry about having shared fees with nonlawyers
in violation of Rule 5.4.
III. ISSUE # 3: COALITION WORK AND WORKING
WITH TRADITIONAL LAWYERS
This example arises in a different context. Here, you and your
three-person progressive law firm have worked over the past five years
44. While the recipient legal services organization may use the gift to pay for its non-
professional staff, Rule 5.4 makes clear that paying staff compensation is not impermissible sharing
with nonlawyers. See id. at r. 5.4(a)(3).
45. See, e.g., Melissa Maleske, The 10 Most Charitable Law Firms, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2015,
8:36 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/708577/the-10-most-charitable-law-firms
(describing law firm support for education and entrepreneurship initiatives, among others).
46. Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 94-14 (1994).
47. Phila. Bar Ass. on Prof’l Guidance Comm., Formal Op. 91-34 (1991).
48. Ethics opinions from the Iowa State Bar Association and the State Bar of Nevada have
concluded that lawyers’ contributions to charities would be impermissible fee-sharing with
nonlawyers. St. Bar of Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 5
(1987); Iowa State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Conduct, Formal Op. 84-7 (1985); see
also Ill. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 92-24 (1993) (opinion later withdrawn).
49. See Maleske, supra note 45.
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as counsel for the Housing Opportunities Collective (“HOC”), a
grassroots community-based organization dedicated to making 
affordable housing more available to low-income residents and
especially to those in immigrant communities. HOC now serves as a lead
plaintiff in a national, federal class-action lawsuit challenging new
regulations issued by the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”) that would privatize many public housing
developments and raise the rent rates for those residents. In the class
action litigation, HOC is represented by a large, well-funded national
nonprofit advocacy organization, the Project for a Just Democracy
(“PJD”). You are co-counsel to PJD in the class action, but with a less
central role.
As part of its litigation and negotiation strategy, PJD convened a
meeting of many housing advocacy groups to develop evidence and to
refine tactics. The HOC leaders, who know the affordable housing field
much better than the PJD lawyers, felt isolated and disrespected in that
process. They also see the PJD lawyers as making strategic and tactical
decisions from the top down, rather than the bottom up, with very little
input from the those who work in the neighborhoods and on the ground.
The PJD lawyers have not included HOC in their deliberations except in
a perfunctory way. In addition to that deep concern, the HOC
representatives fear that PJD will serve as the media face of the
campaign against HUD and take credit that belongs to HOC. HOC relies
on its good and visible reputation for funding and credibility, so the PJD
actions in monopolizing the public relations hurts HOC.
The HOC representatives have shared these concerns with you.
Their conclusion is that HOC should retain better lawyers—lawyers who
will be more accountable to and respectful of the expertise and the
experience of the community organization clients. May you counsel
HOC about that option? May you recommend it? And, if replacing PJD
is not a viable resolution or does not happen for some reason, how
should you work with the PJD counsel?
Ethical and Strategic Assessment of Issue #3
The tensions described in Issue #3 are not uncommon within
coalition work among movement lawyers. They present complex
strategic questions for the community organizers and the grassroots
organizations. The legal ethics issues, though, are less challenging (a
fact that does little to ease the larger complexities present here). We may
separate out the inquiries into two parts: (1) the ethics of counseling a
     
         
 
 
      
      
  
     
    
     
 
      
     
      
       
    
        
        
    
      
         
      
   
     
      
 
     
    
    
          
       
      
                                                          
         
              
               
                
                
     
               
                
               
56 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:43
client about its relationship with separate counsel, and (2) the ethics of
working with co-counsel with whom the lawyer disagrees.
A. The Counseling Responsibilities
The first two questions ask whether you, as counsel to HOC and co-
counsel of record in the class action litigation, may counsel your client,
including offering recommendations about what would be the best way
to proceed, regarding the client’s desire to find more responsive lawyers.
The answer is yes. The substance of the resulting conversation could be
tricky, but the lawyer’s right to have the conversation is clear. Indeed, if
it fits within the subject matter for which you were retained, you must
engage in this counseling.
No considerations of confidentiality or loyalty prohibit a lawyer
from discussing with her client the client’s relationship with co-counsel.
The only conceivable professional rule that might seem applicable is
Rule 4.2, which states that “a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court
order.”50 HOC is a represented “person,” so the rule seems to apply if
read literally. If you were not representing HOC on the same matter as
PJD as co-counsel, Rule 4.2 might be read to preclude you from
discussing the class action with HOC, although that is not the best read
of the rule. Rule 4.2 expressly permits a represented person to consult
with another lawyer about the same matter, often to solicit a second
opinion.51 So nothing precludes you from discussing the entire matter,
including the role of co-counsel, with your client.
Depending on your attorney-client relationship with HOC, you may
have more than just permission, but instead an obligation, to address the
issue with your client. It is a fundamental principle of representation that
a lawyer must address legal issues that affect a client, even if the client
has not raised the issues, if the retainer agreement includes the subject-
matter.52 If there were options available to HOC that might address its
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
51. Comment 4 states that the rule does not “preclude communication with a represented
person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the
matter.” Id. r. 4.2 cmt. 4. That language covers the second opinion context. See Carl A. Pierce,
Variations on a Basic Theme: Revisiting the ABA’s Revision of Model Rule 4.2 (Part II), 70 TENN.
L. REV. 321, 323-24 (2003).
52. “One of an attorney’s basic functions is to advise. Liability can exist because the attorney
failed to provide advice.” Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 608 (Ct. App. 1993). As another
court described the duty: “A lawyer has an obligation to explain the problem, lay out the significant
        
        
 
    
     
        
    
       
        
      
        
         
     
         
         
 
      
   
         
                                                          
               
    
             
 
              
               
               
             
     
              
         
                  
                   
         
         
                  
             
               
               
              
  
               
                
          
             
           
            
             
       
572018] CASE STUDY 3: LITIGATION FINANCES AND COLLABORATION
concerns, and you failed to inform the client about those options, you 
may have breached an important duty.53 
The larger strategic complication for you in this setting is what, if
anything, HOC may do if it is dissatisfied with PJD’s performance as
lead counsel in the class action. In most (if not all) class actions, the
court appoints lead counsel, or “general counsel,” to oversee the
management of the litigation, even if other lawyers serve as counsel of
record.54 The appointment of a law firm to lead counsel status by the
court is typically very competitive.55 The lawyers appointed as lead
counsel do not owe any specific or enforceable duty of loyalty to any
individual client, but instead must act on the broader interests of the
class.56 Even lead plaintiffs may be replaced if their interests no longer
coincide with those of the larger class57 and at times will oppose a class
settlement proposed by lead (i.e., “their”) counsel, if the settlement does
not suit their own individual interests.58 
Therefore, while PJD has a duty to respect its client—the class of
affected tenants and prospective tenants—and must rely on the class
rather than its own interests in its strategic decision making,59 it is not
choices, and help the client make an informed, rational decision.” In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 101
(Ariz. 1993) (en banc).
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
54. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (g)(1)(A) (listing factors federal judges use in appointing
counsel); MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958) (explaining function of “general
counsel” as “to supervise and coordinate the conduct of plaintiffs’ cases”); see also Jill E. Fisch,
Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 650, 654-57 (2002).
55. See generally S. Todd Brown, Plaintiff Control and Domination in Multidistrict Mass
Torts, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 391 (2013).
56. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that
“[a] plaintiff who joins in a class action . . . gives up his or her right to control the litigation in return
for the economies of scale available under” the class action rules).
57. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(1)(B).
58. See Kloster v. McColl (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 350 F.3d 747, 752 (8th Cir.
2003) (approving settlement over objections of three members of one lead plaintiff group in class
action involving four plaintiff classes); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176
(5th Cir. 1978) (“[W]hen a potential conflict arises between the named plaintiffs and the rest of the
class, the class attorney must not allow decisions on behalf of the class to rest exclusively with the
named plaintiffs.”).
59. Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or
Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 145-55 (2001) (criticizing the role of class action counsel for their
inattention to client interests); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts:
When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1179-212 (1995) (reviewing the
reliability of class settlements); Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation:
An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, U. CHI. LEGAL F., 2003, at 583-97 (2003) (addressing
class conflicts); Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1477, 1482-503 (2003) (exploring conflicts within class actions).
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readily apparent that HOC may simply replace PJD with new counsel in
the same fashion to which a non-class client has a nearly unfettered
right.60 The best HOC could do, most likely, would be to prepare, with
other counsel, a petition to the court advocating for the replacement of
PJD with more responsive class counsel.
B. The Ethics and Strategy of Working with Co-Counsel
with Whom the Lawyer Disagrees
The issue of disagreement among lawyers working for a shared
client, or coordinating for clients with related issues, is not new, of
course. “[C]o-counsel and referral relationships between lawyers in
different firms are so common and widespread that controversies are
inevitable, whether linked to tactical disagreements, errors or
misjudgments by one of the participants, client-centered disputes, or
fights over fees.”61 But, as Professor Douglas Richmond reports,
little has been written about the precise contours of the
collaborative relationships.62 
A few general observations might help. If you are co-counsel to the
class along with PJD, then you both assume joint and several
responsibility for the management—or mismanagement—of the
litigation. Co-counsel are treated as joint venturers, who share
responsibilities just as partners do.63 But if the roles of the lawyers are
expressly distinct without overlap of duties and that arrangement is clear
from the respective retainer agreements, then it is possible to avoid the
joint and several liability exposure. 64 Co-counsel are expected to share
information, and their shared discussions are presumptively covered by
attorney-client privilege.65 
If the litigation strategy developed by PJD is substantively
ineffective, you arguably have a duty to intervene, and to prevent
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 & cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A
client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for
payment for the lawyer's services.”); Radek Goral, Justice Dealers: The Ecosystem of American
Litigation Finance, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 98, 103 (2015) (“[T]here is little doubt that the
client’s right to hire and fire a lawyer is almost absolute.”).
61. Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Co-Counsel: Joint Venturers or
Scorpions in a Bottle?, 98 KY. L.J. 461, 462 (2010).
62. Id. For one more recent effort, see generally Stephen C. Sieberson, Two Lawyers, One
Client, and the Duty to Communicate: A Gap in Rules 1.2 and 1.4, 11 U.N.H. L. REV. 27 (2013).
63. Duggins v. Guardianship of Washington, 632 So.2d 420, 427-28 (Miss. 1993); Richmond,
supra note 61, at 487-95.
64. Richmond, supra note 61, at 495.
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(defining “privileged persons” for purpose of the attorney-client privilege as including the client’s
lawyers).
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malpractice.66 But if PJD’s interactions with the community-based 
organizations are substantively acceptable by professional liability
standards, but still disrespectful to the affected community groups, your
responsibilities are less clear. While progressive lawyers and scholars
treat fealty to community as essential to good practice,67 it is not
abundantly clear that failure to achieve that goal constitutes a breach of
the lawyer’s duty of care. 68 Even if not the basis for formal professional
misconduct or discipline, though, PJD’s disrespect of HOC and its
community connections is unacceptable and ought to be addressed.
Much will turn, of course, on the relationship within the class action
litigation between you and PJD, the lead counsel for the plaintiff class.
The education of PJD about its duties to the community will likely take
the form of a subtle negotiation, and the best negotiation teachers
persuade us that a principled, interest-focused approach will be more
effective than an aggressive, competitive stance.69 
66. Sieberson, supra note 62, at 61-63 (discussing Curb Records v. Adams & Reese L.L.P., 
203 F.3d 828 (5th Cir. 1999)).
67. The commitment of movement lawyers, and progressive lawyers generally, to deep
respect for community input is well-established. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Inner-City Anti-
Poverty Campaigns, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1374, 1439-40 (2017); Sameer M. Ashar, Movement
Lawyers in the Fight for Immigrant Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1464, 1495-96 (2017); Scott L.
Cummings, Law and Social Movements: Reimagining the Progressive Canon, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 
441, 494-95 (2018); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2773-76 (2014).
68. Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (in its requirement that a lawyer honor a
client’s strategic choices, “the Court of Appeals seriously undermines the ability of counsel to
present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional evaluation”); William B. Rubenstein,
Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights
Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1652-53 (1997) (noting the deference allowed for counsel’s 
strategic judgments, especially in public interest litigation).
69. See generally, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Evolving Complexity of Dispute Resolution Ethics, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 389 (2017); Jayashri
Srikantiah & Janet Martinez, Applying Negotiations Pedagogy to Clinical Teaching: Tools for
Institutional Client Representation in Law School Clinics, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 283 (2014).
